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Abstract
We test in the context of a dictator game the proposition that individuals may experience a self-control conflict be-
tween the temptation to act selfishly and the better judgment to act pro-socially. We manipulated the likelihood that
individuals would identify self-control conflict, and we measured their trait ability to implement self-control strate-
gies. Our analysis reveals a positive and significant correlation between trait self-control and pro-social behavior in the
treatment where we expected a relatively high likelihood of conflict identification—but not in the treatment where we
expected a low likelihood. The magnitude of the effect is of economic significance. We conclude that subtle cues might
prove sufficient to alter individuals’ perception of allocation opportunities, thereby prompting individuals to draw on
their own cognitive resources to act pro-socially.
Keywords: self-control, pro-social behavior, altruism, dictator game.
1 Introduction
Lured by temptation, individuals may find themselves
acting against their better judgment. Self-control fail-
ure, famously termed akrasia in Plato’s Protagoras (Plato,
1986/B.C. 380), persists throughout domains of daily
life and represents a central issue of both philosophy
and modern-day social sciences. For example, the di-
eter faced with the opportunity to indulge in a delicious
creamy cake may perceive a conflict between indulging
and maintaining a good figure. The student may feel con-
flicted between the desire to go to the cinema and her
better judgment to stay home and study. And, similarly,
the fashionista might feel conflicted between the temp-
tation to purchase new boots and her better judgment to
maintain a responsible budget.
Perhaps less intuitively, but no less importantly, the
question of pro-social versus selfish behavior may be un-
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derstood in similar terms. This conceptualization may
help reconcile conflicting notions in economics of selfish
and pro-social motivations. That individuals should care
much about their own self-interest seems almost tauto-
logical and requires little further exposition, but that in-
dividuals also should care about the interest of others—at
the expense of that of their own—has attracted consider-
able attention (for an overview on social preference, see
Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). For example, many individ-
uals voluntarily contribute to charity or to public goods
(e.g., recycling), and they pay their taxes despite low like-
lihood of punishment for failing to do so.1 Nonetheless,
one could imagine that even individuals of generally pro-
social inclination on occasion may feel tempted to act
selfishly and hence underreport income to the authorities.
That is, pro-social preferences potentially fly in the face
of basic urges for personal gain—or greed—and the in-
dividual may thus experience a self-control conflict be-
tween better judgment to act pro-socially and the tempta-
tion to act selfishly.
Self-control—our capacity to overrule temptation—is
no less complex than it is important. A multitude of
conceptualizations exist, many of which are complemen-
tary. Typically, and in line with classic ideas of the
conflict between reason and passion, authors view self-
control as a “cold” executive function that guides behav-
ior in the face of “hot” impulses to act against better
judgment (see e.g., Loewenstein, 1996; 2000; Metcalfe
& Mischel, 1999; O’Donoghue & Loewenstein, 2007;
1There exists an extensive literature on the motivation behind pro-
social behavior. For example, Bénabou and Tirole (2006) classify the
motivations into three broad categories: intrinsic, extrinsic and image
motivation, and Ariely et al. (2009) employ a similar classification.
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Hofmann et al., 2009). Willpower, then, represents the
combined resources that the executive function—or the
Planner, in the parlance of Thaler and Shefrin (1981)—
brings to bear in a deliberate struggle against temptation
(see, e.g., Baumeister, et al., 1998; Baumeister, 2002).
Such resources may include cognitive strategies to divert
attention away from temptation (Mischel et al., 1989),
strategies of pre-commitment (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981;
Schelling, 1984), or possibly the sheer strength of mind
to hold back from the song of the sirens. Our conceptual-
ization of self-control mirrors these.2
Only recently has the psychological literature started
to explore how the question of pro-social versus self-
ish behavior relates to that of self-control. Loewenstein
(1996; 2000) suggests that selfish behavior may be moti-
vated by visceral urges or drive-states, resembling crav-
ings for relief from hunger, pain, and sexual deprivation.
O’Donoghue and Loewenstein (2007) argue that such
selfish urges may conflict with the “colder”, more abstract
preferences for altruism, as visceral urges for sweets may
conflict with more abstract preferences for a fine figure
or good health. At present, there is but indirect evidence
for this idea. For example, Pronin et al. (2008) show that
decisions about others resemble decisions about “future
selves”, both classes of which contrast to decisions about
less abstract “present selves”. Albrecht et al. (2011) re-
port consistent results; individuals who choose between
immediate and delayed rewards for themselves exhibit
less patience and more affective involvement (activation
in the dopaminergic reward system) than do individuals
who make such choices for others—or for themselves in
the future. Moreover, Curry et al. (2008) find in a stan-
dard public goods game that individuals’ discount rates
are negatively associated with their contributions to the
public good. That is, more “impatient” individuals con-
tributed less to the public good than did “patient” ones.
Arriving at similar results, Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011)
report that patient (vs. impatient) fishermen, whose time
preferences were elicited in the lab, exhibited more co-
operative behavior in a common resource problem and
were in the field less likely to over-exploit the common
pool resource. Furthermore, Burks et al. (2009) find
that “short-term” patience—the β in the β-δ model—is
positively associated with cooperative behavior in a se-
quential prisoner’s dilemma.3 However, Duffy and Smith
(2012) report no effect of cognitive load—a manipula-
tion intended to deplete cognitive resources and thereby
2For details on a related formalization of self-control, see Myrseth
and Wollbrant (2011).
3For more on self-control and time inconsistency in economics,
see e.g., hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounting models by Strotz
(1955), Ainslie (1975; 1992), and Laibson (1997), the “planner-doer”
model by Thaler and Shefrin (1981), and the dual-self model by Fu-
denberg and Levine (2006). For work on procrastination, see e.g.
O’Donoghue and Rabin, (1999) and Burger et al. (2011).
Figure 1: The two-stage model of self-control (from
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impair self-control—on outcomes across treatments in a
repeated multi-player prisoner’s dilemma.
An emerging literature on the “default” response in
games of trust and reciprocity lends further credence to
the notion that altruistic responses require self-control.
Achtziger et al. (2011) subjected players in an ultimatum
game to cognitive resource depletion, and show that de-
pleted proposers made lower offers—they became less al-
truistic. Moreover, depleted responders were more likely
to reject offers that were unfair to themselves—they ex-
hibited “altruistic punishment”. Halali et al. (2011) re-
port the same for responders, but with a different deple-
tion task. Crockett et al. (2008) subjected responders to
acute tryptophan depletion—a procedure that temporar-
ily reduces serotonin levels in the brain and thereby im-
pairs self-control (Schweighofer et al., 2008); reduced
serotonin levels raised rejection rates and this reduction
is positively correlated with impulsive choice in a delay-
discounting task (Crockett et al., 2010).4
Using a trust game, Knoch et al. (2009) subjected
trustees’ right lateral prefrontal cortex to transcranial
magnetic stimulation, which reduces functioning in the
targeted brain region. Trustees, though cognizant that re-
turning a share of the investments was both strategic and
norm-compliant, were unable to do so under impaired ex-
ecutive functioning; self-control seems necessary to act
on the better judgment to resist the temptation to keep the
received investment entirely for oneself.
Closest to our domain of inquiry, Piovesan and
Wengström (2009) measured response times of partici-
pants in a repeated dictator game, lasting 24 periods.5
4Notably, Knoch et al. (2006), report diametrically opposed results.
Subjecting participants’ right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex—the neural
region for executive control (Miller & Cohen, 2001)—to low-frequency
repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation, they find that responders
under impaired executive functioning exhibit substantially lower rejec-
tion rates—less altruistic punishment.
5For a general discussion of the utility and merit of response times
in economics, see Rubinstein (2007).
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They find both across and within participants that lower
response times are associated with more selfish choices.
One interpretation of their results is that the default be-
havior is to act selfishly and that pro-social behavior re-
quires the successful resolution of a self-control conflict,
which slows the response time. Such successful reso-
lution of conflict would require cognitive resources, but
Hauge et al. (2009) report no effect of cognitive load on
players in one-shot dictator games.
In this paper we attempt a more direct test of the hy-
pothesis that pro-social versus selfish behavior may rep-
resent a self-control problem. We employ a standard
measure of pure pro-social behavior, the one-shot dicta-
tor game, which invokes neither concerns for strategy nor
for reciprocity; and a well-grounded psychometric mea-
sure of self-control, the Rosenbaum Self-Control Sched-
ule (1980a). Further, we explore the conditions under
which we expect an association between self-control and
pro-social behavior. In so doing, we rely on two con-
ditions necessary for successfully exercising restraint in
the face of temptation; Myrseth and Fishbach (2009) pro-
pose a two-stage model of self-control, which postulates
that an individual in the face of temptation first identifies
conflict or not between indulging and pursuing a higher-
order goal and, second, that the individual next employs
self-control strategies if and only if conflict was iden-
tified at the first stage (see Figure 1). Critically, self-
control strategies are relevant to the decision to indulge
only when the individual has identified self-control con-
flict. Therefore, one strategy for investigating whether
the problem of pro-social versus selfish behavior resem-
bles one of self-control is to test whether the tendency to
apply self-control strategies is positively associated with
pro-social behavior when individuals have identified self-
control conflict, but less so or not at all when individuals
have not.
Determinants of conflict identification in the face of
temptation have been explored only recently. In some
contexts, the question is almost trivial and identification
of conflict virtually obvious. For example, the diabetic
dieter probably knows that having even a single, tempt-
ing chocolate may incur major costs. However, the ques-
tion of self-control conflict is more ambiguous for the
non-diabetic dieter, who faces the same chocolate. Hav-
ing this one chocolate alone will not incur major costs,
but doing so regularly might. Similarly, the good cit-
izen may find that a general failure to act generously
would represent a major threat to his self-image, but be-
ing stingy on just a couple of occasions is a more am-
biguous matter. Myrseth and Fishbach (2010) use the
term epsilon cost temptation to denote tempting opportu-
nities that incur nothing but trivial costs when consumed
in small amounts, but potentially serious costs when con-
sumed extensively. They argue that individuals identify
self-control conflict in the face of epsilon cost temptation
if and only if two conditions are met: (a) the focal con-
sumption opportunity must be viewed in relation to mul-
tiple additional opportunities, and (b) the decision maker
must assume that similar choices are made for each op-
portunity (as suggested by Ainslie, 1975). That is, con-
sidering the question of whether or not to have a deli-
cious creamy cake will evoke self-control conflict in the
dieter if the dining opportunity is viewed in relation to
future opportunities for dessert consumption, but not if
the dining opportunity is viewed in isolation, as a sin-
gular episode. Similarly, the question of whether or not
to be generous—to donate to a charitable organization—
may elicit self-control conflict if the decision is viewed
in relation to future decisions, but not if the decision is
viewed in isolation. If viewed in relation to future de-
cisions, the question of how much to donate on a sin-
gle occasion may have bearing on the decision maker’s
self-image; donating now—and in the future—indicates
a generous character, whereas keeping the money for
oneself does not. However, if viewed in isolation, the
question of how much to donate has little bearing on
self-image; the present decision of how much to donate
is considered only in light of immediate consequences,
leaving self-image out of the equation. Because a con-
sistent self-image represents an important motivator for
pro-social behavior (see e.g., Bénabou & Tirole, 2011;
Gneezy et al., 2012), we expect that individuals are more
likely to identify self-control conflict between selfish and
pro-social behavior if the allocation decision is seen in re-
lation to future opportunities than if it is seen in isolation.
Myrseth and Fishbach (2010) show that subtle fram-
ing manipulations are sufficient to influence identification
of self-control conflict in the face of epsilon cost temp-
tation. They find that presenting a calendar displaying
the current month, with a grid separating the dates, raised
participants’ subsequent consumption of potato chips rel-
ative to that of participants whom were presented a cal-
endar without a grid. They argue that the gridded cal-
endar activated an isolated (versus interrelated) frame of
the choice opportunity; it made participants more likely
to isolate the date in question and thus less likely to see
the decision task in relation to similar future opportuni-
ties. Consequently, the grid reduced the likelihood that
participants would identify a conflict between the temp-
tation to have chips and the better judgment to maintain
a fine figure and good health. Indeed, participants who
viewed the gridded calendar reported experiencing less
conflict during their decision to have chips or not than
did those who viewed the non-gridded calendar. Further-
more, participants’ trait ability to implement self-control
strategies, measured by Rosenbaum’s (1980a) psychome-
tric scale, was positively associated with chips consump-
tion for those who viewed the calendar without the grid
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Figure 2: Prediction illustration: The relationship be-
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(and who were more likely to identify conflict), but not
for others who viewed the calendar with (and who were
less likely to identify conflict).6 That is, participants
who viewed the calendar without the grid, more likely
than those who viewed the calendar with, identified self-
control conflict and therefore leveraged their self-control
strategies to resist the tempting chips.
To explore our hypothesis that the problem of pro-
social versus selfish behavior may represent one of self-
control, we have applied the empirical strategy from
Myrseth and Fishbach (2010) in the dictator game—a
participant is granted an endowment and asked to split
it between herself and a recipient (for an overview, see
Camerer, 2003), and in our case the Red Cross featured as
recipient (as in e.g., Eckel & Grossman, 1996). The game
thus pits pro-social motivations against self-interest. If
pro-social versus selfish behavior could represent a self-
control conflict, we would expect participants’ trait self-
control, as measured by Rosenbaum’s (1980a) scale, to
correlate positively with pro-social behavior for partici-
pants who have just previously viewed a calendar without
a grid, but less so or not at all for participants who have
viewed a calendar with.
The graph in Figure 2 displays donation, as a func-
tion of level of self-control, for two different levels of
identification likelihood. In the case of low likelihood,
the slope is expected to be weakly positive. In the case
of the higher likelihood, however, the slope is expected
to be strictly greater than that in the case of low likeli-
hood. This means that for a given level of self-control,
one might observe substantially different donation behav-
ior depending on whether conflict was identified or not.
Furthermore, raising likelihood of identification will only
increase donations among those with relatively high lev-
els of self-control.
6The Rosenbaum scale is discussed further in the experimental de-
sign section.
2 Experimental design and proce-
dure
2.1 Participants and recruitment
We recruited participants from various undergraduate and
graduate classes at two universities in Medellín, Colom-
bia, in 2008. At each university, the head administrator
sent to the respective schools’ email lists invitations to
participate in economic experiments. In addition, the ex-
perimenter appeared in classes to introduce himself and
repeat the information from the emails. We held six ses-
sions, with 18–31 participants per session. Nobody par-
ticipated in more than one experimental session, and none
was a student of mathematics, psychology, or economics.
2.2 Overview of procedure
Upon entering the room, participants were given an ex-
perimental id-number to ensure anonymity. The exper-
iment started with the experimenter distributing instruc-
tions for the dictator game (see appendix A). When all
participants had finished reading the instructions, deci-
sion sheets for the dictator game were distributed. The
first page of the decision sheet was blank for all partic-
ipants. The second page was either blank or contained
a calendar, depending on treatment. The third page con-
tained the answer sheet for the dictator game; here the
participant reported the amount she wished sent to the
recipient. Once participants had made their decisions,
the experimenter collected the decision sheets and dis-
tributed a final questionnaire, which contained the Rosen-
baum Self-Control Schedule and some socioeconomic
questions. Upon completing the final questionnaire, par-
ticipants exited the room and claimed their payment in a
building adjacent to that in which the session had been
conducted. Participants were paid in private by the ex-
perimenter.
To ensure credibility, the head administrator posted ex-
perimental id numbers, their respective donations, and a
receipt displaying the total amount donated to the Red
Cross Colombia, within five days of a completed ses-
sion, on a bulletin board in the building adjacent to that
in which the experiment was conducted. This procedure
was outlined as part of recruitment invitation, and in the
instructions for the game itself.
2.3 Dictator game
We employed a dictator game, where a participant is
given an endowment and is asked to split it between her-
self and a recipient. We designated the Colombian Red
Cross as recipient, and each student was granted an en-
dowment of 15,000 Colombian Pesos (e.g., similar to
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Eckel & Grossman, 1996).7 A session lasted on average
about one hour, and average session earnings were 12,000
Colombian Pesos (including a 5,000 Peso show-up fee).
2.4 Experimental treatments
To test our hypothesis, we employed three between-
subject treatments—the isolated, the standard, and the
interrelated treatments. Individuals were randomly as-
signed within a session to one of the three treatments.
The isolated and interrelated treatments were manipu-
lated with the procedure from Myrseth and Fishbach
(2010). Participants viewed a calendar showing the
present month, and the calendar contained either a grid
that separated the dates or no such grid (see Figure 3).
Moreover, in the gridded calendar, the date of the ex-
periment was highlighted in grey; the date was not high-
lighted in the non-gridded calendar. Because we expected
those who saw the gridded calendar to adopt a more iso-
lated view of their subsequent choice opportunities, we
refer to this treatment as the isolated treatment. Con-
versely, because we expected participants who saw the
calendar with no grid to adopt a less isolated view—
the choice opportunities perceived more related to each
other—we refer to this as the interrelated treatment. We
denote as the standard treatment that which features no
calendar and otherwise resembles the typical presentation
of the dictator game.8
2.5 Measuring self-control
To capture individuals’ self-control, we used the Rosen-
baum Self-Control Schedule (Rosenbaum, 1980a). The
psychometric scale measures individuals’ cognitive skills
for exercising self-control in the face of temptation. Each
participant is asked to respond to 36 statements using a 6-
point Likert-scale.9 Cognitive skills, such as willpower,
have been found to be relatively stable within individ-
uals across time, and thus may be said to represent a
personality trait, which we refer to as trait self-control.
The Rosenbaum Self-Control Schedule has been vali-
dated against several criteria, most notably resisting pain
(Rosenbaum, 1980b) and coping with stress (Rosenbaum
& Smira, 1986; Rosenbaum 1989), and mental disability
7The exchange rate at the time of the experiment was approximately
1 USD = 1,762.00 Colombian Pesos.
8A priori, we could not be sure how the view of participants in the
standard treatment would compare to those of participants in the other
two treatments—this would depend on the “default” view they had com-
ing into the experiment and on the framing of the standard treatment
itself. However, a reasonable guess was that the participants in the stan-
dard treatment would fall somewhere between the narrow view in the
isolated treatment and the wide view in the interrelated treatment.
9Each statement is graded from –3 to +3. Thus, “perfect” self-
control corresponds to +108 and no self-control at all to –108 (see Ap-
pendix C).
(Rosenbaum & Palmon, 1984). Henceforth, we refer the
outcome of the Rosenbaum Self-Control Schedule only
as the Rosenbaum score.
We expected pro-social behavior to depend on the in-
teraction between identification of self-control conflict
(induced by the treatments) and success at the conflict
stage (see Figure 1). The isolated treatment should yield
a lower probability of conflict identification relative to
that of other treatments. Hence, trait self-control, as mea-
sured by the Rosenbaum score, was expected to exhibit a
weaker correlation with pro-social behavior. In contrast,
the interrelated treatment yields a higher probability of
conflict identification. Hence, trait self-control was ex-
pected to exhibit a stronger positive correlation with pro-
social behavior.
3 Results
In Table 1, we summarize the descriptive results from the
dictator game. Participants donated 8691, 8321, and 7892
pesos in the interrelated, standard, and isolated treat-
ments, respectively. That is, donations rates were on
the order of 50% of participants’ endowment. Further,
participants’ Rosenbaum scores were 30, 33, and 33 in
said treatments. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of
no difference in donations across treatments (p = 0.646;
Kruskal-Wallis test). Similarly, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of no difference in Rosenbaum score across
treatments (p = 0.595).
We hypothesized that participants’ trait Rosenbaum
score would exhibit a stronger positive correlation with
charitable giving in the interrelated treatment; partic-
ipants in the interrelated treatment more likely would
identify self-control conflict than would participants in
the other two treatments. One way of testing this hypoth-
esis is to examine mean donations by treatments, for dif-
ferent levels of the Rosenbaum score. Figure 4 displays
mean donations for varying thresholds of the Rosenbaum
score, set at the mean of the Rosenbaum score (>32), one
standard deviation below (>8) and one standard devia-
tion above (>56). In line with our hypothesis, the dif-
ferences in mean distributions grow larger as we raise
the Rosenbaum restriction threshold. Applying Kruskal-
Wallis tests for the null hypothesis of no difference in
distributions, we obtain p-values 0.646 (no Rosenbaum
restriction), 0.194 (>8), 0.086 (>32), and 0.031 (>56).10
That is, only for participants’ whose Rosenbaum score is
greater than 56 is the difference in distributions signifi-
cant at the 5%-level.
We also tested our hypothesis with three OLS regres-
sions, as reported in Table 2. All have donation as the
dependent variable, and each includes a main effect for
10Consistent results attained also with corresponding ANOVAs.
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Figure 3: Calendar treatments.
Figure 3. Calendar treatments 
 
Before we continue with the experiment, please take a moment to consider this 
month’s calendar:  
 
The isolated treatment                                        The interrelated treatment  
 (the highlighted date is the same as today’s date). 
 
Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat  Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat 
        1 2 3          1 2 3 
4 5 6 7 8 9 10  4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17  11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
18 19 20 21 22 23 24  18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
25 26 27 28 29 30 31  25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
               
What is today’s date?_________ 
 




Table 1: Descriptive statistics (standard deviations in parentheses).
Isolated treatment Standard treatment Interrelated treatment HO: No difference in
distributions
Variable n Mean n Mean n Mean (Kruskal-Wallis p)





Rosenbaum score 47 33.47 (26.18) 48 32.58 (23.77) 45 30.20 (22.04) 0.595
the Rosenbaum. We have set up the regressions such that
we may compare directly the slopes of the Rosenbaum in
the three conditions, in particular highlighting the differ-
ence between the slopes in the interrelated and isolated
treatments. Accordingly, specification (1), which takes
the standard treatment as the baseline, includes a dummy
for the isolated treatment and an interaction between the
isolated treatment and the Rosenbaum. Specification (2)
also takes the standard treatment as the baseline, but in-
cludes a dummy for the interrelated treatment and an
interaction between the interrelated treatment and the
Rosenbaum. In contrast, specification (3) takes the inter-
related treatment as the baseline, and includes a dummy
for the isolated treatment and an interaction between the
isolated treatment and the Rosenbaum. It is this latter
specification that represents the crucial test of our hy-
pothesis. We expected that the Rosenbaum would exhibit
a positive association with self-control in the interrelated
treatment, and that this association would be smaller, if
present at all, in the isolated treatment.
Consistent with our predictions, specification (3) re-
veals that the Rosenbaum is positive and significant (p <
.01), and that the interaction between the Rosenbaum and
the isolated treatment is negative and significant (p < .05).
That is, we find in the interrelated treatment a positive
and significant association between donations and trait
self-control, and that this association is weaker in the iso-
lated treatment. Examining specification (1), which takes
the standard treatment as the baseline, the Rosenbaum is
positive, but not significant, and the interaction indicates
that the Rosenbaum exhibits a weaker association with
donations in the isolated than in the standard treatment,
though this interaction is not significant. Moving to spec-
ification (2), which also takes the standard treatment as
the baseline, the interaction indicates that the Rosenbaum
exhibits a stronger association with donations in the in-
terrelated than in the standard treatment, though this in-
teraction is not significant. In other words, although we
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Table 2: OLS regression results.
Model specification: (1) (2) (3)
Baseline: Standard treatment Standard treatment Interrelated treatment
Dependent variable: Donation Donation Donation
Isolated 1323.7 (0.84) 2307.8 (1.54)
Rosenbaum · Isolated –55.7 (–1.39) –99.9** (–2.53)
Rosenbaum 41.0 (1.35) 41.3 (1.36) 86.0*** (2.89)
Interrelated –1025.8 (–0.67)
Rosenbaum · Interrelated 47.2 (1.13)
Constant 7157.0*** (5.74) 7194.3*** (5.72) 5896.6*** (5.18)
n 95 93 92
R2 0.031 0.100 0.095
Note: t statistics in parentheses, *** denotes significance at the 1%-level, ** at the 5%-
level, * at the 10%-level (all two-tailed); robust standard errors. The regression controls for
location of the experiment. Results are robust to gender and academic major.
Figure 4: Mean donations by treatment and varying re-




































None (n = 146) > 8 (n = 124) > 32 (n = 84) > 56 (n = 24)
Isolated treatment (Grid)
Standard treatment (No calendar)
Interrelated treatment (No grid)
observe in the standard treatment a positive association
between Rosenbaum and donations, it is not statistically
different from zero. However, it is also not statistically
different from that obtained in the interrelated treatment,
and the association obtained in the interrelated treatment
is statistically different from zero. Nevertheless, the set of
regressions provide evidence for our hypothesis that trait
self-control exhibits a stronger positive correlation with
donations in the interrelated treatment (calendar without
a grid) than it does in the isolated treatment (calendar
with a grid).11 Furthermore, the estimated effect is of
economic significance. The marginal effect of the Rosen-
baum score in the interrelated treatment is 86 pesos. In
the interrelated treatment, a one standard deviation in-
crease in the Rosenbaum score (approximately 24 units
in the test score) raises donations by about 2,064 Colom-
bian Pesos. Compared to the predicted contribution of
8,649 pesos from a mean-level Rosenbaum score, in the
interrelated treatment, this corresponds to a 24% increase
in donations.
To illustrate our results, we plot predicted donations
based on estimated parameters for three values of the
Rosenbaum score: the mean, one standard deviation be-
low, and one standard deviation above. The predicted val-
ues for donations are calculated for each treatment and
presented in Figure 5.12
4 Discussion
Our objective was to explore the hypothesis that individ-
uals may experience a self-control conflict between act-
ing in the interest of self or in that of others. We did so
by adapting the empirical strategy of Myrseth and Fish-
bach (2010) to a dictator game. Trait self-control and do-
nations were positively correlated for participants who,
prior to playing the game, viewed a calendar without a
11The correlations (Spearman’s rhos) between donations and Rosen-
baum score are 0.40 (p < .01), 0.18 (p = .23), and –0.11 (p = .47), for
the interrelated, standard, and isolated treatments, respectively.
12For the standard treatment, we use the parameters obtained in spec-
ification (1). For the isolated and interrelated treatments, we use speci-
fication (3).
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Figure 5: Predicted values of donation by treatment and





































Note: Low Rosenbaum (mean Rosenbaum—one stan-
dard deviation of Rosenbaum) = 32 – 24 = 8. Mean
Rosenbaum = 32. High Rosenbaum (mean Rosenbaum
+ one standard deviation of Rosenbaum) = 32 + 24 = 56.
grid, which was intended to raise the likelihood of con-
flict identification. However, trait self-control and dona-
tions were not correlated for participants who viewed a
calendar with a grid, which was intended to reduce the
likelihood of conflict identification.
We have explored a hypothesis that would help recon-
cile conflicting ideas in economics about selfish and pro-
social preferences. Although the literature to date has
documented the existence of both selfish and pro-social
preferences (for an overview, see Fehr & Schmidt, 2006),
we have here explored how the conflict between the two
matters. We found evidence that individuals may expe-
rience a conflict between their better judgment to act in
the interest of others and a temptation to act in their own
interest. Our findings are consistent with prior evidence
from psychology (Curry et al., 2008; Pronin et al., 2008;
see also Sheldon & Fishbach, 2011) and also with recent
work in economics on motivations in trust and ultima-
tum games (Knoch et al., 2006; 2009; Achtziger et al.,
2011; Halali et al., 2011), on time preferences in public
goods games (Fehr & Leibbrandt, 2011) and in sequential
prisoner’s dilemmas (Burks et al., 2009), and on reaction
times in dictator games (Piovesan & Wengström, 2009).
To conceptualize the question of selfish versus pro-
social behavior as a problem of self-control problem may
prove insightful at a number of levels. The literature on
self-control is extensive, and it offers a substantial con-
ceptual toolkit. The application of models of intraper-
sonal conflict (e.g., Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; Schelling,
1984; Fudenberg & Levine, 2006) may advance the study
of pro-social behavior. For example, one could imag-
ine application to strategic settings, where the question
of pro-social versus selfish behavior determines predicted
equilibria. How the “rational self” strategizes against her
own impulses, which in part may be determined by her
beliefs about others’ beliefs, may prove crucial for un-
derstanding pro-social outcomes. Furthermore, and at a
more practical level, the conceptual toolkit for the study
of self-control may provide useful prescriptive measures.
The application of self-control strategies, such as com-
mitment devices, may help promote pro-social behavior.
Our findings also reveal that subtle cues in the environ-
ment may prove sufficient to alter an individual’s percep-
tion of an allocation opportunity between self and others.
The cues may thereby determine the extent to which in-
dividuals use their own cognitive resources to promote
pro-social behavior. We demonstrated this in the context
of charitable giving and show that the results are of eco-
nomic significance. We therefore conclude that relatively
costless measures may influence individuals to use their
cognitive resources to promote pro-social behavior.
Though we have provided preliminary evidence for
the conceptualization that temptation to favor self-interest
may conflict with better judgment, we do not claim uni-
versality. Rather, we believe our conceptualization ap-
plies in situations where feelings of greed dominate those
(if any) to act pro-socially. Of course, as O’Donoghue
and Loewenstein (2007) suggest, there is good reason
to think that the pattern in other circumstances may re-
verse. Specifically, when empathetic emotion is particu-
larly strong, individuals may feel tempted to be pro-social
even knowing that they ought not. For example, one
could imagine a face-to-face interaction with a suspected
con artist, seeking quick cash for an “emergency”. One
knows better, but one cannot help yielding to the sorry
gestures. Similarly, but in the context of Salvation Army
solicitations, Andreoni et al. (2011) show that individu-
als actively avoid being asked to make donations. This
is consistent with an interpretation that individuals antic-
ipate an impulse to give and pre-commitment to avoid
it. Because our present space of inquiry concerned the
relationship between self-control and feelings of greed,
we deliberately designed our study to minimize feelings
of empathy by keeping the recipient of pro-social behav-
ior relatively abstract (the Red Cross). Had the recipient
been a lively baby, we would of course have expected a
different emotional reaction.
Furthermore, structural situational features, such as
defaults, may influence how self-control relates to pro-
social behavior. Because cognitive resources are helpful
for overcoming behavioral “inertia”, defaults are more
likely to influence the behavior of individuals with low
rather than high levels of self-control. In the context of
a trust game (also known as the investment game), Evans
et al. (2011) find evidence for this idea: “trustors” (in-
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vestors) with low self-control—either so induced by cog-
nitive resource depletion or so endowed in personality—
are more susceptible to default effects than are trustors
with high self-control.
With this paper, we have attempted not to a settle a
matter, but rather to open a door. Future research may
explore the effect of tuning up feelings of empathy, while
tuning down those of greed. Extending the study to other
games may prove insightful, as might interactions with
different defaults. Formal modeling could also help im-
prove our understanding of the role of self-control in
social interaction. Opportunities for fruitful extensions
abound.
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Appendix A: General instructions
for the dictator game (variations in
parentheses)13
You are about to participate in an experiment on decision-
making. Regardless of what decision you make, you will
receive 5,000 Colombian Pesos (COP) for participating
in the experiment.
Now that we have begun, all communication is strictly
forbidden. Participants who communicate will be ex-
cluded from the experiment and will not receive payment.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and a
member of the experimenter team will attend to you.
First you will take part in a decision-making task and
then you will have to answer a few questionnaires. Al-
13Translated from Spanish.
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though some questions may appear strange to you, we
ask that you still take them seriously. All your answers
remain confidential and anonymous. To identify you
during and after the experiment, we use only the numbers
you received when you entered the room. These numbers
will be used to identify you when paying you at the end
of the experiment.
Please note: You must write your identification num-
ber on all your answer sheets in order for us to be able to
pay you.
When the experiment is over, you will be asked to leave
the room. As you leave the room, you should hand in
your identification number to a member of the experi-
menter team. He or she will place the number in an en-
velope, seal it and hand it back to you to keep your de-
cision anonymous and confidential. Then please walk to
the next room to claim your payment. To receive your
payment (about 20 minutes after the end of the experi-
ment), you will need to present the sealed envelope with
your identification still inside, just as it was handed to you
before leaving the room. The payment will then be given
to you in private in another sealed envelope to keep your
earnings confidential.
Decision task: You have been given and endowment
of 15,000 COP. Your task is to decide how to divide the
15,000 COP between Red Cross Colombia and yourself.
Write down the amount you wish to donate to Red Cross
Colombia and how much you would like to keep for your-
self on your decision sheet, which will soon be handed to
you. In this experiment, any decision is valid. This means
you can donate all, some or nothing.
After the experiment is over, the experimenters will
add all donations and send the total amount to Red Cross
Colombia within 5 days. A receipt of the total donation
will be posted on the notice board of the IDEA (Departa-
mento de Ingeniería Sanitaria).
Appendix B: The Rosenbaum Self-
Control Schedule
Directions - Indicate how characteristic or descriptive
each of the following statements is of you by using the
code given below.
+3 very characteristic of me, extremely descriptive
+2 rather characteristic of me, quite descriptive
+1 somewhat characteristic of me, slightly descriptive
–1 somewhat uncharacteristic of me, slightly unde-
scriptive
–2 rather uncharacteristic of me, quite undescriptive
–3 very uncharacteristic of me, extremely nondescrip-
tive
Note: * = item is reverse scored.
1. When I do a boring job, I think about the less boring
parts of the job and the reward that I will receive once
I am finished.
2. When I have to do something that is anxiety arous-
ing for me, I try to visualize how I will overcome my
anxieties while doing it.
3. Often by changing my way of thinking I am able to
change my feelings about almost everything.
4. I often find it difficult to overcome my feelings of ner-
vousness and tension without any outside help.*
5. When I am feeling depressed I try to think about pleas-
ant events.
6. I cannot avoid thinking about mistakes I have made in
the past.*
7. When I am faced with a difficult problem, I try to
approach its solution in a systematic way.
8. I usually do my duties quicker when somebody is pres-
suring me.*
9. When I am faced with a difficult decision, I prefer to
postpone making a decision even if all the facts are at
my disposal.*
10. When I find that I have difficulties in concentrating
on my reading, I look for ways to increase my concen-
tration.
11. When I plan to work, I remove all the things that are
not relevant to my work.
12. When I try to get rid of a bad habit, I first try to find
out all the factors that maintain this habit.
13. When an unpleasant thought is bothering me, I try to
think about something pleasant.
14. If I would smoke two packages of cigarettes a day, I
probably would need outside help to stop smoking.*
15. When I am in a low mood, I try to act cheerful so my
mood will change.
16. If I had the pills with me, I would take a tranquilizer
whenever I felt tense and nervous.*
17. When I am depressed, I try to keep myself busy with
things that I like.
18. I tend to postpone unpleasant duties even if I could
perform them immediately.*
19. I need outside help to get rid of some of my bad
habits.*
20. When I find it difficult to settle down and do a certain
job, I look for ways to help me settle down.
21. Although it makes me feel bad, I cannot avoid think-
ing about all kinds of possible catastrophes in the fu-
ture.*
22. First of all I prefer to finish a job that I have to do and
then start doing the things I really like.
23. When I feel pain in a certain part of my body, I try
not to think about it.
24. My self-esteem increases once I am able to overcome
a bad habit.
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25. In order to overcome bad feelings that accompany
failure, I often tell myself that it is not so catastrophic
and that I can do something about it.
26. When I feel that I am too impulsive, I tell myself
“stop and think before you do anything."
27. Even when I am terribly angry at somebody, I con-
sider my actions very carefully.
28. Facing the need to make a decision, I usually find out
all the possible alternatives instead of deciding quickly
and spontaneously.
29. Usually I do first the things I really like to do even if
there are more urgent things to do.*
30. When I realize that I cannot help but be late for an
important meeting, I tell myself to keep calm.
31. When I feel pain in my body, I try to divert my
thoughts from it.
32. I usually plan my work when faced with a number of
things to do.
33. When I am short of money, I decide to record all my
expenses in order to plan more carefully for the future.
34. If I find it difficult to concentrate on a certain job, I
divide the job into smaller segments.
35. Quite often I cannot overcome unpleasant thoughts
that bother me.*
36. Once I am hungry and unable to eat, I try to divert my
thoughts away from my stomach or try to imagine that
I am satisfied.
